

Session is Dead Long live JWT

JavaCro Rovinj, Croatia – May 2017

Hrvoje Crnjak

Software Developer @ Five

@HrvojeCrnjak



Session vs. JWT

Reference vs. Data object

Stateful vs. Stateless

JWT

Debunked

(JSON Web Token)

NOT Authentication Protocol

NOT Authorization Protocol

JWT

Debunked

(JSON Web Token)

NOT Protocol

Standard for representing claims (data)



Then what's the catch?

The catch is in how we **use JWTs**

Client – Server communication

Session ID + Cookie

<https://app.yourapp.com>





Create session and
store it on server-side

Find stored session
based on Session ID

Client – Server communication

JWT + Authorization header

<https://app.yourapp.com>



Create token with necessary User data (basic info, roles, etc.)

Validate token and extract data

Session vs. JWT **analysis**

Session

- **Authentication**
 - On the Server
 - Create Session
 - Store Session
 - Response
 - Session ID
 - Client storage in Cookie
- **Accessing Resource**
 - Cookie header with Session ID
 - Find Session based on ID

JWT


- **Authentication**
 - On the Server
 - Create Token
 - DO NOT store Token
 - Response
 - Token
 - Client storage up to JS
- **Accessing resource**
 - Authorization header with JWT
 - Read data from JWT itself

JUN T



JWT

- JSON Web Token
- Pronounced “*jot*” /dʒɒt/
- Open standard
 - IETF - RFC 7519
 - Proposed in May 2015




JWT

- Standard for representing **claims** between parties
 - Transferred **securely** and in **compact and URL-safe** way
- Compact and URL-safe
 - Base64 encoded with URL-safe alphabet
 - (- , _) instead of (+ , /)
- Claim
 - A piece of information about a subject (user)
 - Represented as name/value pair
 - Claim Name - **always string**
 - Claim Value - **any JSON value**



JWT


- Claim names
 - **Registered** Claim names
 - Defined by the JWT standard
 - **Public** Claim names
 - Defined by 3rd parties and registered at IANA
 - Usually defined by standards that rely on JWT
 - example : OpenId Connect (given_name, family_name, nickname, ...)
 - **Private** Claim names
 - Custom names defined by JWT users
 - Anyone creating and using JWTs in their App
- All Claims are **optional**



JWT

- Registered Claim names


```
{  
  jti : "JWT ID"  
}
```



JWT

- Registered Claim names

```
{  
  jti : "JWT ID",  
  iss : "JWT Issuer"  
}
```



JWT

- Registered Claim names


```
{
```

```
  jti : "JWT ID",
```

```
  iss : "JWT Issuer",
```

```
  sub : "Subject of JWT"
```

```
}
```



JWT

- Registered Claim names

{

jti : “JWT ID”,

iss : “JWT Issuer”,

sub : “Subject of JWT”,

aud : “Audience – intended recipients”

}




JWT

- Registered Claim names

```
{  
  jti : "JWT ID",  
  iss : "JWT Issuer",  
  sub : "Subject of JWT",  
  aud : "Audience – intended recipients",  
  iat : "Time at which JWT was issued"  
}
```

**Seconds Since
the Epoch**






MAY 12, 1984

JWT

- Registered Claim names

```
{  
  jti : "JWT ID",  
  iss : "JWT Issuer",  
  sub : "Subject of JWT",  
  aud : "Audience – intended recipients",  
  iat : "Time at which JWT was issued"  
}
```


**Seconds Since
the Epoch**



JWT

- Registered Claim names


```
{  
  jti : "JWT ID",  
  iss : "JWT Issuer",  
  sub : "Subject of JWT",  
  aud : "Audience – intended recipients",  
  iat : "Time at which JWT was issued",  
  nbf : "Time before which JWT must not be accepted"  
}
```



JWT

- Registered Claim names

```
{  
  jti : "JWT ID",  
  iss : "JWT Issuer",  
  sub : "Subject of JWT",  
  aud : "Audience – intended recipients",  
  iat : "Time at which JWT was issued",  
  nbf : "Time before which JWT must not be accepted",  
  exp : "Time after which JWT must not be accepted"  
}
```



JWT

- Securing JWT
 - Signed
 - Claims in “plain text”
 - Guaranteed token integrity
 - Defined through **JWS** (JSON Web Signature) standard
 - Encrypted
 - Claims encrypted
 - Guaranteed token integrity and data privacy
 - Defined through **JWE** (JSON Web Encryption) standard



JWT

- Securing JWT
 - Signed
 - Claims in “plain text”
 - Guaranteed token integrity
 - Defined through **JWS** (JSON Web Signature) standard
 - Encrypted
 - Claims encrypted
 - Guaranteed token integrity and data privacy
 - Defined through **JWE** (JSON Web Encryption) standard




JWT

- Signing JWT
 - A number of supported algorithms
 - Defined in **JWA** (JSON Web Algorithms) standard
 - Most notable are
 - HS256 – HMAC using SHA-256
 - Symmetric key alg.
 - Offers integrity and authenticity
 - RS256 – RSA using SHA-256
 - ES256 – ECDSA using SHA-256
 - Asymmetric key alg.
 - Offers integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation



JWT

- Composing JWT




JWT

- Composing JWT



- 3 parts
 - Header
 - Holds info about algorithm used for signing
 - Payload
 - Holds claims
 - Signature
- Separated by “*dot*” and Base64 encoded



JWT


- Composing JWT



Base64 encode data



```
{  
  sub : "1234567890",  
  name : "John Doe",  
  admin : true  
}
```



JWT


- Composing JWT



Base64 encode data



```
{  
  alg : "HS256",  
  typ : "JWT"  
}
```



JWT

- Composing JWT



↑
Base64 encode data

↑
SIGN (
encoded_Header + "." + encoded_Payload
, **secretKey**
)



JWT

- Composing JWT



eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.

eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoiYXNjaW9uRydWV9.

TJVA95OrM7E2cBab30RMHrHDcEfxjoYZgeFONFh7HgQ




JWT

FAQ #1

Who can create JWTs?

Anyone who knows **how** to create them

- Pick a library and start coding!
 - jjwt , java-jwt , etc.



JWT

FAQ #2

Who can read JWTs?

Anyone who knows how to **read** them

- You need
 - Library (again)
 - A secret key if you want to verify JWTs validity
 - For clients (like web browsers) that's not necessary
 - For servers it should be



JWT

FAQ #3

How can JWTs be transferred between parties?

The standard **doesn't** specify that

- Possible scenarios
 - Authorization header
 - **Authorization : Bearer** ..JWT... scheme used
 - Most common, standardized
 - Custom header
 - Part of URL
 - Part of request body





Pros & Cons



JWT is Self-Contained



Self-contained

- All the relevant data is **inside** JWT
 - User information represented through claims
 - Data required to check its validity
- **Benefits**
 - Client-side
 - Data can be read directly from token
 - User ID, name, email, roles, ...
 - Server-side
 - On the next slide ...

Session ID

JSESSIONID=8D4D409560B
D4D0CCCA00105325115F3

JWT

```
{  
  sub : "1234567890",  
  name : "John Doe",  
  role : "ADMIN"  
}
```




JWT is Stateless



Stateless

- JWT is self-contained
 - **No need** for State
 - **No** data stored on Server-side




JWT is Scalable




Scalable

- State is **evil**
 - When we use Session...



Scalable

- State is **evil**
 - No State (Session) **no problem!**



- No worries about
 - Session replication
 - Synchronization
 - Inter-node communication




JWT is more flexible



Flexible

- Content of JWT completely **configurable**
- Token creation and usage can be **separated**



Flexible

- “Separation of concerns”
 - **Benefits**
 - Outsource your auth. concerns
 - FB, Google, Amazon, Auth0, etc.
 - **Disadvantages**
 - Someone else can create valid tokens for your service
 - You need to trust the Auth. Provider
 - **Setup**
 - Register your App with Auth. Provider
 - Define claims needed in JWT
 - Agree on a shared key



JWT is immune to CSRF attacks*



Immune to CSRF*

- “Session riding”
 - User tricked into making harmful requests
 - User already logged to that service
 - Relies on Session Cookie
- No Session Cookie
 - **No Problem**



Quick recap

JWT Pros

- Self-contained
- Stateless
- Scalable
- More flexible
 - Auth. outsourcing
- Immune to CSRF*



JWT Cons



Size



Size

- Smallest JWT **larger** than Session ID
 - Avg. Session ID + Cookie name = **45 Bytes**
- Header size constraints
 - HTTP defines none
 - **But servers do**
 - Tomcat – 8 KB
 - Jetty – 6 KB

No. of Claims	Size (Bytes)
0	75
1	125
3	150
5	225
10	350
15	550



Storing and Sending JWTs



Storage and transmission

- With Cookies everything is handled **automatically**
 - Server instructs Browser to store Session ID
 - Browser automatically sends stored Session ID
- With JWTs
 - **Storage**
 - Handled by client-side JS
 - Options
 - **Cookie** (not the same as Cookies used to store Session ID)
 - **LocalStorage**
 - **Transmission**
 - Handled by client-side JS
 - Options
 - Some frameworks have built-in support



More vulnerable to XSS



XSS problem

- Cross-site scripting
 - Like “SQL injection” – but for client-side JS
- **Rogue JS**
 - **It can**
 - Change the data displayed to the User
 - Make harmful requests to the Server
 - **It can't**
 - Steal your Session ID (inside **HttpOnly** Cookie)
- But it can **steal** JWT
 - Handled by client-side JS
- **Solution**
 - Sanitize User inputs!



Signed, not encrypted*



Signed, not encrypted*

- Common use-case
 - Signed JWTs
 - **Readable** on client-side
- **“Solution”**
 - Use encrypted JWTs
- **Disadvantage**
 - Client can't read User info from JWT
 - Client needs to contact Server to get that info
- **Best practice**
 - Don't put anything too sensitive inside JWT
 - Always use HTTPS



Token revocation



Token revocation

- How to deny access to already logged User?
- **Friendly User**
 - User pressed Logout button
 - **Session**
 - Session is invalidated server-side
 - **JWT**
 - Token is deleted client-side



Token revocation

- How to deny access to already logged User?
- **Harmful User**
 - Hijacked Session ID or JWT
 - Someone is sending requests with *stolen* credentials
 - **Session**
 - Session is invalidated server-side
 - **JWT**
 - No explicit way of revoking already issued tokens
 - Only **trade-offs**



Token revocation

- “Revoking” JWT token
 - Keep a list of revoked JWTs
 - **Disadvantage**
 - Introducing state to server-side
 - Make JWTs short-lived
 - **Disadvantage**
 - User needs to login more frequently
 - Refresh tokens can be used to mitigate frequent login issue
- **Nuclear option**
 - Change JWT **signing** key
 - **Disadvantage**
 - Invalidate **all** tokens
 - All users denied access



Quick recap

JWT Pros

- Self-contained
- Stateless
- Scalable
- More flexible
 - Auth. outsourcing
- Immune to CSRF*



JWT Cons

- Size
- Storage and transmission
- More vulnerable to XSS
- Signed vs. encrypted
- Token revocation



Quick recap

JWT Pros

- Self-contained
- Stateless
- Scalable
- More flexible
 - Auth. outsourcing
- Immune to CSRF*



JWT Cons

- Size
- Storage and transmission
- More vulnerable to XSS
- Signed vs. encrypted
- **Token revocation**



Thanks for your time!

Q & A

Spring Security + JWT example

Github

hcrnjak / spring-jwt-example